Given e > 0, two strategies f and f 0 are e-equivalent for Player 1 if for all i A f1; . . . ; ng and all strategies g of Player 2,
where U i denotes the ith component of U, i ¼ 1; . . . ; n. An e-purification of a strategy is a pure strategy e-equivalent to it.
theorem Suppose that m is conditionally atomless for Player 1. Then for every e > 0, every strategy of Player 1 has an e-purification.
The proof is found in §4.
We next extend the discussion to n-person games. There are n players ði ¼ 1; . . . ; nÞ; n observation spaces ðX i ; X i Þ, each isomorphic to the real unit interval with its Borel s-field; and n action sets K i , each finite. The probability measure m is now defined on the product s-field X ¼ X 1 n Á Á Á n X n . For each k A K ¼ K 1 Â Á Á Á Â K n , x A X ¼ X 1 Â Á Á Á Â X n , and i A f1; . . . ; ng, u i ðk; xÞ denotes the (scalar) payo¤ to Player i from the joint move k when the joint observation is x. The joint payo¤ function is u ¼ ðu 1 ; . . . ; u n Þ. For each k A K, uðk; ÁÞ is assumed m-integrable.
The mixed action set for i is D K , the unit simplex in the Euclidean space indexed by the elements of K i . A strategy for Player i is a function f i from X i to D where k ¼ ðk 1 ; . . . ; k n Þ and x ¼ ðx 1 ; . . . ; x n Þ. Given e > 0, two strategies f j and f 0j of player j are e-equivalent if for each strategy ðn À 1Þ-tuple g Àj of the players other than j and for each player i A f1; . . . ; ng,
where ð f j ; g Àj Þ denotes the strategy combination ðg 1 ; . . . ; g jÀ1 ; f j ; g jþ1 ; . . . ; g n Þ. As before, an e-purification of a strategy is a pure strategy e-equivalent to it.
The measure m is conditionally atomless for i if for (almost) every ðn À 1Þ-tuple of observations y of the players other than i, the conditional probability measure mðÁjyÞ on X i is atomless.
corollary A Suppose that m is conditionally atomless for i. Then for every e > 0, every strategy of i has an e-purification.
Proof Follows from the Theorem by taking X in the Theorem to be X i here and Y in the Theorem to be the product of all X j other than X i here.
An e-equilibrium point is an n-tuple f of strategies such that for each player i and each strategy g i of i,
An equilibrium point is a 0-equilibrium point. An e-purification of an equilibrium point f is an n-tuple f 0 of pure strategies such that every ntuple f 00 obtained from f by replacing some of the f j by f 0j (including, of course, f 0 itself ) is an e-equilibrium point and satisfies
for all i. In words, any group of players can switch to pure strategies without appreciably a¤ecting the payo¤ to anybody and while maintaining approximate equilibrium. Let m ij denote the marginal probability measure on X i Â X j induced by m. The measure m is weakly conditionally atomless for i if for every j other than i and (almost) every observation y j of j, the conditional probability measure m ij ðÁjy j Þ on X i is atomless. In words, after making his own observation, every player other than i perceives an atomless distribution for i's observations. corollary B Suppose that m is weakly conditionally atomless for all players. Then for every e > 0, every equilibrium point has an e-purification.
Corollary B is proved in §5. In §7 we show that weak conditional atomlessness is not su‰cient for the e-purification of strategies.
Discussion
Consider the case in which there are just two players, with two possible actions each. Take the observation sets X and Y of both players to be the unit interval ½0; 1, and suppose the payo¤s are independent of the observations, but depend nontrivially on Player 1's action. Even in this simple case it is not always possible to purify mixed strategies exactly. For a counterexample, taken from Radner and Rosenthal [1982] , let m be twice Lebesgue measure on the right triangle above the diagonal, i.e., fðx; yÞ : y X xg, and 0 elsewhere. Then mðÁjyÞ is 1=y times Lebesgue measure on the interval ½0; y, and 0 elsewhere. If it were possible for Player 1 to purify (exactly) the mixed strategy in which he plays 1=2-1=2 independent of his observation, then there would exist a subset S of X with mðSjyÞ ¼ 1=2 for almost all y, i.e., a set that intersects each interval in exactly half its Lebesgue measure; and it is known that there is no such set. Now while Player 1 cannot purify exactly, he can purify approximately. Indeed, setting
(the set consisting of alternate intervals of length 1=2m), we find mðS m jyÞ ! 1 2 ðas m ! yÞ for almost every y. This implies that for each e > 0, for su‰ciently large m the pure strategy corresponding in the obvious way to S m is an e-purification of the 1=2-1=2 strategy. The same is true whenever the measures mðÁjyÞ are absolutely continuous, i.e., whenever m is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure on the square X Â Y .
Unfortunately, without the absolute continuity it need not be true that, a.e., mðS m jyÞ ! 1=2. For example, let T be the set of all x in X with a dyadic representation P y i¼1 x i =2 i in which x i ¼ 1 whenever i is odd. Then T is in a natural one-one correspondence with ½0; 1, and so there is an atomless measure on T corresponding to Lebesgue measure on ½0; 1; equivalently, there is an atomless measure z on X with support T. Define m on X Â Y by mðÁjyÞ ¼ z for all y. Now T X S 2 j is empty for even j, hence zðS 2 j Þ ¼ 0, and hence mðS m jyÞ cannot converge to 1/2. In this particular case the proof can be rescued by using the fact that z, like any atomless measure on ½0; 1, transforms into Lebesgue measure under an appropriate measurable automorphism of ½0; 1. But it is possible to choose m so that all the mðÁjyÞ are mutually singular to each other and to Lebesgue measure, or have mutually singular components; and then no single transformation can simultaneously transform them all to absolutely continuous measures.5
To overcome this problem we proceed, as before, to cut up Player 1's observation space X into 2m intervals of equal length; but rather than choosing alternate intervals with certainty, we choose each interval with 5. Let mðÁjyÞ be the measure on ½0; 1 induced by Bernoulli trials with probability y, i.e., the measure of a dyadic interval ½ j=2 i ; ð j þ 1Þ=2 i is y t ð1 À yÞ iÀt where t is the number of 1's in the dyadic representation of j. When y ¼ 1=2 this is Lebesgue measure, but otherwise it is singular to Lebesgue measure; moreover, all the mðÁjyÞ are mutually singular. Note that mðS 2 j jyÞ ¼ y for all j, so that mðS m jyÞ almost never converges to 1/2. probability 1/2, independently. Denoting the random union of intervals so chosen by S m , we conclude as in the law of large numbers that for almost all y-indeed, whenever mðÁjyÞ is atomless-almost surely mðS m jyÞ ! 1=2. By Fubini's theorem we can reverse these ''almost universal'' quantifiers and conclude that the probability is 1 that for almost all y, mðS m jyÞ ! 1=2. But since this has probability 1, it holds for at least one specific realization fS 1 ; S 2 ; . . .g of the random sequence fS 1 ; S 2 ; . . .g. That is, mðS m jyÞ ! 1=2 for almost all y, which is what we need. Note that we have not actually constructed a ''purifying sequence'' fS 1 ; S 2 ; . . .g-one such that mðS m jyÞ ! 1=2 for almost all y. In §6 we present two alternative approaches. First, we show that the sequence fS m g, whose members consist of alternate intervals of length 1=2m, has a purifying subsequence; in fact, one with asymptotic density 1. Second, multiplying each S m by the same positive constant b (i.e., considering alternate intervals of length b=2m rather than 1=2m), we then use the same basic idea as above (Fubini's theorem) to show that fbS m g is itself purifying for almost all b. While these ''constructions'' are not entirely explicit either, they do give us a better idea of how e-purifications might look.6
For a ''practical'' example in which m does not satisfy the absolute continuity condition, consider a 3-person game in which Player 1 observes g 2 and g 3 , Player 2 observes g 1 and g 3 , and Player 3 observes g 1 and g 2 , each g i being uniformly and independently distributed on ½0; 1. Since m is supported on the possible triples of observations and these form a 3-dimensional subset of the 6-dimensional product of the observation spaces, it cannot be absolutely continuous. Here m is not conditionally atomless for any player, but it is weakly conditionally atomless for all players; hence Corollary B applies, and thus all equilibria can be e-purified.
6. Our methods do enable the actual construction, in the sense of Turing, of a purifying sequence. For example, since fS m g has a purifying subsequence, for each k there is an m k such that jmðS mk jyÞ À 1=2j < 1=k except possibly for a set of y of measure 1=2 k at most. Assuming that the mðS m jyÞ are explicitly given and calculable in the appropriate sense, we can just try one m after another until we reach an appropriate m k . Similarly the first proof can be adapted to construct a purifying sequence, since each S m has only finitely many realizations.
Note that a sequence can only be purifying ''relative to m'' (i.e., to the family fmðÁjyÞg); there can be no ''absolutely purifying'' sequence fS m g, i.e., one such that zðS m Þ ! 1=2 for all atomless probability measures z. This follows from a theorem of Erdos, Kestelman, and Rogers [1963] , according to which every sequence fS m g of sets (in the unit interval) whose Lebesgue measure lðS m Þ is bounded away from zero has a subsequence whose intersection contains a perfect set P. An absolutely purifying sequence fS m g would have to satisfy the hypothesis, since lðS m Þ ! 1=2 (if necessary we could discard a finite number of S m ). Hence the conclusion is satisfied; if, then, z is an atomless probability measure with support P, then zðS m Þ ¼ 1 for infinitely many m, and so zðS m Þ n 1=2.
Strategic Games: Extensive 538
Without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.) we take ðX ; XÞ to be the unit interval with its Borel sets. In the lemmas, n is an arbitrary but fixed probability measure on X Â Y , with the property that nðÁjyÞ is atomless, n g -a.e.; and throughout this section, e is an arbitrary but fixed positive real number.
Proof For m ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; let the partition H m be composed of the elements
Since nðÁjyÞ is atomless, the cumulative distribution function nð½0; xjyÞ is continuous, and so uniformly continuous, in x. Hence Proof Let H m be as in the proof of Lemma 1 for m ¼ 1; 2 . . . : Consider an auxiliary probability space ðW; F; PÞ and a sequence Z 1 ; Z 2 ; . . . of independent random variables on this space taking values in V with
(where E denotes expectation with respect to P). Next, define a function
Thus b m takes values in a space of random variables on ðW; FÞ. For every y, ð
Hence, for all y
Similarly, for all y (and denoting by Z j k the kth coordinate of Z j ),
for every y, and so by Lemma 1 and Fubini's theorem,
Hence there is a realization b of b M such that
by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. The desired conclusion follows.
Strategic Games: Extensive
Define a seminorm7 on the functions f from X to E K by
lemma 3 For any strategy f of Player 1, there is a pure strategy f 0 with
Proof If f has only one value s, this is Lemma 2 with T ¼ X . If f is simple (i.e., takes on only finitely many values in D K ), denote by Q the number of distinct values taken on by f, replace e in Lemma 2 by e=Q, and partition X into the Q sets over which f is constant. The pure strategy f 0 is then pieced together from the Q functions constructed in Lemma 2. Finally, if f is any strategy, there is a simple strategy d such that sup x k f ðxÞ À dðxÞk < e, and hence k f À dk n < e. Thus in the k k nseminorm, f is approximable by simple strategies. Since in the previous paragraph we showed that simple strategies are approximable by pure strategies, our conclusion follows.
Proof of Theorem Assume first that u i ðk; l; x; yÞ is always nonnegative. If
then all the U i vanish identically, and there is nothing to prove. Otherwise, let Y 0 be the space Y Â f1; . . . ; ng Â K Â L, with generic element y 0 ¼ ðy; i; k; lÞ, and define a probability measure n on X Â Y 0 by
where the positive constant c is chosen to make n a probability measure. Since m is conditionally atomless for Player 1, so is n. Replacing Y by Y 0 in Lemma 3 and in the definition of the seminorm k k n , we conclude that for every strategy f of Player 1 there is a pure strategy f 0 such that k f À f 0 k n < e. Then for all strategies g of Player 2,
and the theorem follows. If u i ðk; l; x; yÞ has negative values, set u ¼ u þ À u À , where u þ and u À are nonnegative and integrable. Applying the ''nonnegative theorem'' just proven to the 2n-dimensional payo¤ ðu þ ; u À Þ, we obtain the desired theorem for the original vector payo¤ u.
5 Proof of Corollary B lemma 4 Let G 1 ; . . . ; G m be m di¤erent 2-person games, in each of which Player 1 has the same observation set X 0 and the same action set K 0 . Suppose that each m j is conditionally atomless for Player 1, where m j is the probability measure on pairs of observations in the jth game G j . Then for every e > 0 and every strategy f of Player 1, there is a pure strategy f 0 that is e-equivalent to f simultaneously in all the games G 1 ; . . . ; G m .
Proof We may assume w.l.o.g. that in each G j the payo¤ u j is onedimensional; for if it is n j -dimensional, we can replace G j by n j games di¤ering only in their payo¤s.
Let G be the 2-person game in which chance first chooses one of the games G j with probability 1=m; Player 2, but not Player 1, is informed of chance's choice; and the chosen game is then played. The payo¤ in G is the m-dimensional vector whose jth component is 0 unless G j was the game chosen by chance; and, in that case, the payo¤ in G is the payo¤ in G j . Formally, denote the action and observation sets of Player 2 in G j by L j and Y j , respectively, and the payo¤ function by u j . W.l.o.g. let the Y j be pairwise disjoint; and define
. . . ; l m ÞÞ. In G, the action sets for Players 1 and 2 are K 0 and L, respectively; the observation sets are X 0 and Y, respectively; the probability measure m on X 0 Â Y is given by
and the payo¤ is the m-vector u, the jth component of which is defined by u j ðk 0 ; l; x 0 ; yÞ ¼ u j ðk 0 ; l j ; x 0 ; yÞ when y A Y j , 0 otherwise. Now let f be a strategy of Player 1, and let e > 0. By the Theorem, there is a pure strategy f 0 that is ðe=mÞ-equivalent to f in G. 
so the proof of Lemma 4 is complete.
Proof of Corollary B The pure strategies f 0i are defined by an induction on the index i. Suppose that f 0i has been defined for all i < m, where 1 W m W n. Let H m be the set of all strategy n-tuples h that are obtained from f by replacing some subset (possibly empty) of the first m À 1 strategies f i in the n-tuple f by the corresponding f 0i . For each h in H m and each j other than m, define a 2-person game G mjh between m and j (in the roles of Players 1 and 2, respectively) by fixing the strategies of the players i other than m and j to be h i , and letting m and j play as in the original game. The payo¤ in G mjh is the n-dimensional vector resulting from the original game. Formally, in G mjh the observation sets of m and j are X m and X j ; the action sets are K m and K j ; the probability measure on X m Â X j is the marginal probability measure m mj induced by m; and the payo¤ u mjh ðk m ; k j ; x m ; x j Þ is the expectation of uðk; xÞ when the x i other than x m and x j are jointly distributed according to the conditional probability measure mðÁjx m ; x j Þ on Â i0m; j X i , and the distribution of the k i other than k m and k j is determined by the strategies h i . Applying Lemma 4 to the ð2n À m À 1Þ2 mÀ2 games G mjh (remember that m is fixed in each single step of the induction), we deduce that there is a strategy f 0m such that for all h in H m , all j 0 m, all strategies g j of j, and all i
It is this f 0m that is used for the mth step of the inductive definition of f 0 . Note that since f 0m is now defined for all m, including m ¼ n, the definition of H m extends to m ¼ n þ 1 as well. We now prove by induction on m that for m ¼ 1; . . . ; n þ 1, each h in H m is an ðe=2 nÀmþ2 Þ-equilibrium point and satisfies
For m ¼ 1 this follows from the fact that in that case h ¼ f and f is a 0-equilibrium point. Suppose it is true for m (with m W n); we will show it for m þ 1. 
Approximate Purification of Mixed Strategies
From the definition of f 0m and the fact that h is an ðe=2 nÀmþ2 Þ-equilibrium point, we deduce that h 0 is an ðe=2 nÀðmþ1Þþ2 Þ-equilibrium point; from (5), (7), and (6) we obtain
for all i; so our induction is complete.
The end of the induction-i.e., the case m ¼ n þ 1-asserts precisely that f 0 is an e-purification of the equilibrium point f, so the proof of Corollary B is complete.
The Fourier Approach
In this section we indicate two alternative constructions of e-purifications of strategies that assign the same mixed action to each observation-the situation addressed in Lemma 2. From this, the proof of the Theorem can be completed as in §4. For simplicity and transparency, we confine ourselves in this section to the case in which Player 1 has just two actions, the strategy to be e-purified is his 1=2-1=2 strategy, and X ¼ ½0; 1.
As indicated in §3, constructing e-purifications of this strategy for arbitrarily small e is equivalent to constructing purifying sequences of subsets of X, i.e., sequences fS 1 ; S 2 ; . . .g such that mðS m jyÞ ! 1=2 for m Y -almost all y (henceforth simply almost all y). Note that a sequence that is purifying for one m may not be purifying for another m; and, indeed, our constructions will depend on m.
The starting point is again the sequence fS 1 ; S 2 ; . . .g defined in §3. If we subtract 1/2 from the indicator function of S m , we get a function f m whose graph looks like a squared-o¤ sine wave. Let f be the periodic function on the real line that has period 1 and equals f 1 on ½0; 1Þ; then f m ðxÞ ¼ f ðmxÞ for x A ½0; 1, and the sequence fS m g is purifying if and only if for almost all y,
where m y ¼ mðÁjyÞ. If we replace f in (8) by an (appropriately normalized) sine or cosine, the integral becomes a Fourier-Stieltjes (henceforth simply Fourier) coe‰cient of m y , and thus (8) becomes the statement that the Fourier coe‰cients of the measures m y approach 0. It has long been known that there are atomless measures whose Fourier coe‰cients do not tend to zero (Zygmund [1955, § §2.213, 5.714, 11 .52]); and this jibes well with the discussion in §3, where we showed that there are m for which fS m g is not purifying. On the other hand, by a theorem of Wiener (Katznelson [1976, p. 42] ), the squared absolute values of the Fourier coe‰cients of atomless measures z do tend to 0 in Cesaro mean (i.C.m.), i.e.,
whereẑ zðmÞ is the Fourier coe‰cient8
This implies that an appropriate subsequence of theẑ zðmÞ tends to 0. Moreover, we can find such a subsequence that will work simultaneously for almost all the m y . Indeed, the jm m y ðmÞj are bounded by 1; hence applying Lebesgue's dominated convergence theorem to (9), we find
Hence for some sequence of integers
Again applying Lebesgue's theorem, we deduce that for almost all y, jm m y ðm j Þj ! 0 and jm m y ðÀm j Þj ! 0 as j ! y, which in turn implies that for almost all y, the m j th sine and cosine coe‰cients of m j tend to 0. To finish our argument, it remains only to replace the true Fourier coe‰cients by the ''squared-o¤ '' Fourier coe‰cients appearing in (8). We proceed by establishing Wiener's theorem for these squared-o¤ coefficients. Let f e and f Àe be the continuous periodic functions pictured in Figure 1 . Let g e and g Àe be trigonometric polynomials,9 also with period 1, that uniformly approximate f e and f Àe respectively to within e, and let a 9. Finite sums of the form P m a m e 2pimx . We use the Weierstrass approximation theorem (e.g., Katznelson [1976, p. 15] The Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and (9) 
From f e X f X f Àe we deduce c 
since the left side does not depend on e, it follows that jc m j ! 0, i.C.m., which is the ''squared-o¤ '' Wiener theorem we were seeking. Using Lebesgue's dominated convergence theorem as before, we deduce that (8) holds if m ! y through an appropriate sequence of integers, i.e., proposition 11 For each m, there is a purifying subsequence fS m j g of fS m g.
From the above proof one can actually get somewhat more. The subsequence fm j g is not sparse; on the contrary, one can find a purifying subsequence with density 1. In other words, for given large m the chances are very good that S m yields an e-purifying strategy; the inappropriate, Figure 1 f has the solid graph, f e the dashed graph, and f Àe the dotted graph. Where they are not seen, the dashed and dotted lines coincide with the solid line. The abscissas of some points are indicated; their ordinates are G ''bad'' S m are few and far between. This jibes well with the counterexample in §3, where the ''bad'' m are the even powers of 2.
For the second construction we require an extension of the Wiener theorem in several directions. We have already noted that by the CauchySchwarz inequality, jẑ zðmÞj 2 in (9) can be replaced by jẑ zðmÞj. Next, the interval of summation in (9) can be replaced by any interval of the same length, with a starting point that may depend arbitrarily on M; this is proved in the same way as (9). Third, Wiener's theorem may be extended to the continuous (Fourier transform) case (Katznelson [1976, p. 138] ). Putting all this together yields
for atomless measures z, whereẑ zðxÞ is the Fourier transform z zðxÞ ¼ Using Fubini's theorem to interchange the integrations over a and y, we deduce that for almost all a, for almost all y,
The same proof works if a varies over any interval with positive endpoints. Thus we have proposition 14 For each m, for almost all a, the sequence fS m a g is purifying.
A Counterexample
In Corollary A, conditional atomlessness cannot be replaced by weak conditional atomlessness. Explicitly, we exhibit a 3-person game in which the prior measure m is weakly conditionally atomless for one of the players, but there is an e > 0 and a strategy of that player that has no e-purification. The game may easily be modified so that m is weakly conditionally atomless for all players and still the same conclusion holds.
In this game, Player 1 observes both y and z, Player 2 observes only y, and Player 3 observes only z; here ðy; zÞ is distributed over the unit square in accordance with a probability measure y with almost all the conditional measures yðÁjyÞ and yðÁjzÞ atomless. The observation spaces Y and Z of Players 2 and 3 respectively both are the unit interval, whereas Player 1's observation space Y Â Z is the unit square. The prior measure m is formally defined on the four-dimensional cube ðY Â ZÞ Â Y Â Z, but is actually supported on the two-dimensional ''diagonal'' of this cube. If we identify this diagonal with Y Â Z, then when restricted to the diagonal, m becomes y; thus the atomlessness of the yðÁjyÞ and yðÁjzÞ implies that m is weakly conditionally atomless for Player 1. On the other hand, m is not conditionally atomless for Player 1, since by pooling their information, Players 2 and 3 get to know the precise observation of Player 1.
Let all three players have the two-point action set f0; 1g, and define the (one-dimensional) payo¤ to be 1 if all players choose the same action, 
We will construct a y for which this is false. Note that if B is in some Q l , and Q is an atom of Q m , then yðB Â QÞ W 2 m lðBÞlðQÞ ¼ lðBÞ ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
where l is Lebesgue measure. To apply Caratheodory's theorem, let fD k g be a nondecreasing sequence of quartic sets whose union is a quartic set D; we must show that
11. Rectangles in Y Â Z correspond to pairs of pure strategies of Players 2 and 3.
12. Nonempty member of Q 2 m not containing any other nonempty member, i.e., a square of the form ði=4 . But this implies that yðÁjyÞ is atomless, and similarly almost all the yðÁjzÞ are atomless. Of course, it follows that y itself is atomless, though this can also be shown directly.
Suppose that one of the A m satisfies (15) To construct an example in which m is weakly conditionally atomless for all players, let w be a random variable that is uniformly distributed over ½0; 1, is independent of ðy; zÞ and is observed by Players 2 and 3 but not by Player 1; the action sets and payo¤s remain as before (w does not a¤ect the payo¤s). This is similar to the situation in the last paragraph of §3. In particular, the prior measure is weakly conditionally atomless for all players; but the strategy of Player 1 discussed above still cannot be (0.05)-purified.
The Literature
Both approximate and exact purification appear in the literature. The underlying ideas are usually quite di¤erent; approximate theorems only require some form of continuity (the weakest being the atomlessness assumed here), whereas exact theorems usually assume, in addition, a combination of independence and finiteness. Bellman and Blackwell [1949] and Dvoretzky, Wald, and Wolfowitz [1951] pioneered the area. Both treated two-person games in which only Player 1's observations and actions are explicit, Player 2 being represented directly by his strategies (compare Aumann [1964] , which also treats games that are ''extensive'' for one player, ''normal'' for all others). Bellman and Blackwell use the alternate-interval idea described at the beginning of §3 to purify 1's strategies approximately when the payo¤ satisfies certain continuity conditions.13 Dvoretzky, Wald, and Wolfowitz use Lyapunov's theorem on the range of a vector measure to purify 1's strategies exactly when 2 has only finitely many strategies; in the opposite case, they adduce an example showing that exact purification is in general impossible. Dvoretzky, Wald, and Wolfowitz also prove an approximate purification theorem when 2's strategy space is conditionally compact14 in a metric based on the payo¤s; the proof uses the conditional compactness to approximate 2's strategy space by a finite space, and then applies the exact purification theorem quoted above.
In the more recent literature, as in this paper, all players' observations and actions are explicit. Radner and Rosenthal [1982] purify equilibria exactly when the observations have independent, atomless distributions, and each player's payo¤ depends only on his own observation15; whereas Milgrom and Weber show that equilibria can still be exactly purified when there is a finite family of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events, conditional on each of which the condition of Radner and Rosenthal 13. Piecewise continuity in 1's observations (using the metric of the unit interval), uniform over 1's actions and 2's strategies.
14. Every sequence has a Cauchy subsequence. 15. Radner and Rosenthal also obtain a somewhat more general theorem on exact purification, which is still not as general as that of Milgrom and Weber. holds. Milgrom and Weber also purify strategies approximately when the joint distribution m of observations is absolutely continuous with respect to the product of the marginals (i.e., the distributions of individual observations), each of which they assume atomless. Here again the alternate-interval idea works; thus by transforming the marginals to Lebesgue measure, one can assume that m is absolutely continuous w.r.t. Lebesgue measure, and then the S m form a purifying sequence (cf. §3). While determining the precise relationships between all these results is not always a straightforward matter, it may be seen that our results are not subsumed under any of them. In the other direction, it should be noted that Milgrom and Weber work with compact action spaces, rather than the finite action spaces we assumed; but for finite action spaces, our Corollary A implies the approximate purification theorem of Milgrom and Weber. Finally, both the papers of Milgrom and Weber and of Radner and Rosenthal discuss topics unrelated to purification, including conditions for the existence of (approximate or exact) equilibria.
